Introduction

The basis of authority is a perennial issue in political philosophy. The question of authority revolves around why we ought to assent to the decisions and commands of another, especially when we disagree with them. Elected officials, judges, and various government agents impose laws and decisions on us. We frequently take obedience for granted, but on some occasions we demand a reason justifying such obedience. Such questions are significant due to the role that states and authorities play in our lives. Do we simply obey police and laws because we fear punishment? Justice is not simply the virtue of avoiding pain. Within the Catholic tradition, authority is the necessary means by which a community works towards its common good. Political philosophy in the classical and Christian traditions considers the overall community to be the greatest practical good we can achieve. A major shift occurs with the emergence of what has come to be known as “political liberalism,” which emphasizes protecting individual rights and liberty against the community. Catholic philosophers have attempted to apply classical political principles to contemporary circumstances, drawing largely on the work of St. Thomas Aquinas. Among Catholic philosophers, however, serious disputes occur in understanding the relation between the good of individuals and their political community.

This article entry will explore the meaning of political authority according to the Catholic intellectual tradition. The issues discussed in this article are significant for several reasons. First, the notion of political authority and the common good is a key point that underlies Catholic social teaching (CST). The principles of CST are theological and not philosophical, since they follow from the Gospel and revelation. Nonetheless, CST presupposes certain principles of political philosophy. A proper account of authority in political philosophy allows us to understand and apply the conclusions of CST. Secondly, an accurate understanding of the Catholic tradition’s teaching on authority provides a better lens for understanding how to engage with the contemporary political order. Third, reflecting on the meaning of authority and the common good helps Catholics form their consciences according to a Christian-inspired view of politics. When fulfilling their civic responsibilities, Catholic citizens often face a series of difficult questions. Unfortunately, politicians often support a mix of policies, some of which support Catholic moral teaching and others that contradict it. Ballot initiatives might intend some genuine goods but do so through unacceptable means or with unwanted consequences. Citizens must decide how to achieve the greatest good through their choices. A proper formation in the meaning and purpose of authority and the common good allows citizens to develop habits of prudence which help them confront such difficult choices.

This article will consist of three general parts. First, we will consider the essential meaning and function of political authority. The core purpose of authority is to ensure cooperation towards a shared purpose. Second, we will examine several trends within the Catholic and Thomistic tradition regarding the political common good and its relation to individuals. As we will see, the notion of the common good plays a central role in determining the meaning of rights, assessing justice, and ultimately justifying authority. Finally, we will look to how Catholics can respond to the issue of unjust laws and authority. Catholics often find themselves in a position of attempting to make the best of bad circumstances. Grasping the principles of authority and the common good helps today’s Catholics make decisions that achieve the greatest goods possible. Citizens are bound in conscience to abide by just laws and the dictates of leaders. We will see, however, that unjust laws present a complicated situation.

Authority

Authority is the act of unifying multiple individuals towards a common purpose. Men and women cooperating to achieve a common purpose must agree on the best means to achieve that end. In the act of authority, one or more individuals select a specific means for achieving the desired end. The edicts of a king and of democratic vote are both examples of authority. Authority presupposes two or more individuals engaged in some kind of practical cooperation. It also requires some people to accept decisions with which they disagree. Yves Simon asserts that “unity of action depends upon unity of judgment, and unity of judgment can be produced either by way of unanimity or by way of authority.”{1} In the case of unanimous agreement, all those involved are, in fact, just following their own judgment. Authority is not necessary. If they do not agree on how to achieve their goal, then they need some other method for choosing. Authority selects one plan despite lacking unanimous consent. Some participants will have to act in ways they think are more likely to fail. Without authority, groups will only achieve common goods on the rare occasion that they all have the same opinion. For most situations, reaching common goods needs authority.

St. Thomas Aquinas famously defined law as “an ordinance of reason for the common good, made by one with care of the common good, and promulgated.”{2} The common good is the purpose of law, and only one with proper authority may make law. St. Thomas describes goods as “common” in at least three ways. A good can be common by predication (in praedicando), by causation (in causando), and as what we call public goods (bona communia).{3} The first, goods by predication, describes those goods that are universals but which only exist in individuals. Health, culture, species, and other similar goods are found in this or that human being even though we grasp them as universals. We call men and women “human” because they are each particular instantiations of humanity. Goods common through causation refer to those pertaining to final causality. Members of a given group identify a goal or purpose they all seek. This end serves as the first principle of practical reason. It is the fundamental reason for their individual actions. Musicians in an orchestra make their respective choices because of the shared purpose of making beautiful and harmonious music. Lastly, public goods are those material goods that all use but which belong to no one privately. Roads, water, police and fire services, and similar items that fall under distributive justice are all public goods.

St. Thomas explains that only those with the care of the common good, whether the whole people or their representatives, can justly make laws.{4} Therefore, authority is closely connected with the creation of law. Authorities ensure that all individuals cooperate for the sake of achieving the shared aim. Football teams, orchestras, and military forces all involve members coordinating their actions to achieve some purpose. What ensures that all individuals will work together for their common end? Unless all members of a group agree on the best means to reach their end, they will need some mechanism for determining which of several plans they will pursue. A common end requires some kind of cooperation between individuals. We intuitively recognize this fact in many areas of life. Football players need to follow the coach’s plays, otherwise they cannot win. Musicians in an orchestra without a conductor, each playing as he or she judges best, will produce a terrible cacophony of noise rather than a beautiful symphony. Soldiers who do not coordinate their movements will fail in achieving their mission’s objective. Some method must exist to determine just how this specific set of individuals will reach their agreed upon goal. Authority in political communities thus presumes goods that are common by causation.{5}

As Simon noted, we ensure unity of action either through unanimous agreement or authority.{6} Why this dichotomy? Disagreement in practical matters is not solely the product of vicious motives or ignorance. Genuinely virtuous and intelligent people can come to different judgments about what is best to be done. Practical reason is an act of the intellect: choosing means to achieve some desired end. Such goals can be either common or personal. All those involved in the group might happen to share the same opinion on what is best. In such a case, the members will naturally cooperate. Most problems, however, allow for multiple legitimate solutions. Disagreement on practical questions is not always a matter of vice or lack of intelligence. As Simon explains, practical reasoning does not have the same degree of certainty or capacity for demonstration as other sciences.{7} We can show that a certain mathematical problem only allows one answer. The human body has a specific set of bones. We can prove that these answers are true. To be sure, some disagreements are a matter of vice. Individuals do sometimes have ulterior motives and seek their own private benefit. Yet, practical disagreement is still possible even if we assume that all members truly intend the same common good.

Authority and power are related but distinct concepts. Following Jacques Maritain, we can describe authority as “the right to direct and to command” and power as “the force, which one can use” to coerce compliance with commands.{8} The one with authority often is not the one who uses power. Judges make rulings on criminal cases, but police officers and prison guards use force to imprison the guilty. Most of the time, those with authority must have recourse to power in order to ensure that subordinates accept their authoritative judgments. There could, theoretically, be a community in which authority without power is sufficient. If all individuals were virtuous and abided by an authority’s commands, power would not strictly be necessary. Moreover, we must distinguish between the core meaning of authority and the process or means for identifying those who hold authority. Authority is not exclusive to monarchy or aristocracy.{9} Both kings and elected officials have authority. The king issues decrees, and his servants then enact his wishes. Democratic representatives pass laws which are then enforced by their delegated agents. In a monarchy or aristocracy, only those with a certain amount of wealth or familial relation may possess authority. In democracies, the community bestows authority on certain individuals. In any of these instances, however, the act of authority is still the same. Even in the case of pure democracy, in which all political acts are the result of a community vote, those in the majority exercise authority over the minority.

How then do we justify the use of authority? Simon identifies two mistaken attempts to defend authority. He describes these as paternalism and the “coach driver theory” of representation. Paternalism refers to instances when those in authority claim to act on behalf and in place of those whom they rule. Simon explains that “the paternal function of authority is not essential but substitutional.”{10} Paternal authority is substitutional because it takes the place of the one who falls under authority. Parents and teachers are examples of paternal authority. The parent makes decisions for the child because of a lack of reason in the child. The teacher determines what is right and wrong for a student to do when learning mathematics, grammar, science, etc.  Simon explains that “deficiency always signifies the lack of a perfection.”{11} Children lack the rational capacity to judge right from wrong and to make decisions about their own lives. Students do not know how to reach the conclusion of mathematical problems on their own. At some point, paternal authority is no longer necessary because the individual ceases to be in a state of deficiency. Children grow up, and students gain the necessary proficiency. In political matters, paternal authority assumes that the ruled are not sufficient to make their own decisions.{12} Kings or aristocrats may look at the mass of people and deem them simply incapable of choosing for themselves. Lords and kings must act for the benefit of their subjects. Paternalism is mistaken because it assumes authority is only necessary because of imperfection. As we noted above, authority is necessary even assuming a population that is fully virtuous and equally intelligent.

A second mistaken view of authority is what Simon calls the “coach-driver theory” of representation. This theory asserts that “men in power are delegated by the people, that they are given definite missions by the people and that in the fulfillment of their missions they remain strictly subordinated to the people that delegated them.”{13} Simon describes the experience many have had of using a cab or rideshare service. We pay a fee so that another individual will drive us to a specific destination. The reason we use this service is because it is faster and perhaps cheaper than other forms of transportation. The key point, and the reason Simon calls this the “coach driver theory,” is that passengers expect the driver to take them to a specific place. Drivers cannot judge where they believe it is best for me to be. In terms of authority, then, the coach driver theory views elected officials as merely in power to uphold the desires and wishes of those who have elected them. Simon criticizes this view because it treats the elected official as a mere functionary. According to the coach driver theory, “authority remains in the hands of the governed.”{14} Those who are ruled do not actually obey their elected officials. Rather, they obey themselves.{15} The entire question of authority concerns why an individual ought to follow the dictates of another. The coach driver theory fails to answer this question but offers only the appearance of an answer. If authority requires accepting judgments with which you may disagree, then the role of an elected official is not merely to enact the wishes of the governed. Officials must have the ability to act in ways that some of those who elected them dislike.

Simon offers two genuine accounts of authority, which he calls the “theory of divine right” and the “transmission theory.” By divine right, Simon means “implying both (1) that the power of the temporal ruler is directly from God and (2) that God himself designates the person of the temporal ruler.”{16} St. Thomas’s framework of eternal law shows that, indeed, any law ultimately finds its source of authority and power in God.{17} The relevant aspect of divine right is that God selects this or that individual to possess authority. The Catholic Church considers authority to be determined as a matter of divine right.{18} St. Peter and the apostles were directly given authority by Jesus Christ, and so we have an actual instance of authority through divine action. The authority of the apostles concerns the teaching of faith and morals, but we can also consider the right of the Church to administer the sacraments or even, as a punishment, to restrict the availability of the sacraments. The Catholic Church is a true example of the theory of divine right. The historic appeal to the divine right for temporal rulers such as kings and queens operates in the same way, except in this case the coercive acts are of a temporal and material nature.

A final theory of authority, most closely harmonious with CST, is called the “transmission theory.” In this view, the people, by virtue of their human nature created by God, first possess authority and then pass it along to rulers.{19} As Simon observes, St. Thomas views law as the work of the whole community or certain designated individuals.{20} The community might have any number of ways of selecting those on whom to bestow authority, and they might select one, few, or many individuals. The key point is that the people pass their own authority to others. They accept that they will be bound in justice to follow the commands and edicts of whomever they select. Clearly this view of authority is most compatible with a democratic regime. The transmission theory differs from paternalism because it does not depend on any imperfection in the people. It maintains the recognition that authority will be necessary even amongst the best of people. Transmission also differs from the coach driver theory to the extent that those selected to receive authority do not simply enact the wishes of the people. Leaders often make decisions contrary to the desires or beliefs of those they govern. Authority means that people accept the decisions of another even when they disagree. As we have seen, the coach driver theory does not actually invest authority in rulers. In the transmission theory, the people agree to abide by their leaders’ judgments.

Transmission and divine right keep the essence of authority, although within different circumstances. Divine right is not contrary to the nature of authority, though it would seem to be ill-fitted for democratic and secular states. In the case of the Catholic Church, we have the historical record of Jesus granting authority to the apostles to teach and govern the sacramental community He founded. The papacy is filled via vote, and so we might acknowledge a kind of democratic element within the divine right concept. At the very least, we need not imagine that divine right means that a unique act of God establishes every individual who assumes office. The basis of authority and the mechanism of passing on this authority does indeed come from God. Only the apostles possessed the right to name their successors, and only those who have received this authority from apostles can continue this line. Thus, apostolic succession begins with a divine act in Christ. The continuance of that authority in another person, however, does not require an extraordinary act of God. Therefore, those subject to the successors of the apostles are bound today to submit to their judgment. Divine right does not have the same role for temporal power because of the fact that it would prevent the transmission of authority from the people to those who hold authority. The divine right theory places the transmission of authority in God’s designation of the individual who is given power. In such a setting, the people would not actually have authority. The fact that the people possess authority and therefore may transmit this authority to one or more individuals could follow from God’s will, but the choice of which individuals receive authority from the people would not be the result of a divine designation.{21}

The transmission theory also maintains the essence of authority but is more fitting for a democratic order. This theory holds that people under authority genuinely bind themselves to others’ choices. Individuals within this body must adhere to the decisions of the whole. The individuals separately do not possess authority, but rather the collection of all men and women in the community are authoritative. In a direct and complete democracy, every authoritative act is an act of the whole. Each judgment concerning the whole community follows from a majority vote. One of the clear signs that authority exists in direct democracies is that those on the losing side of any vote are still bound to follow the majority decision. Other regimes pass authority on to some designated individuals who then possess that exclusive role. The mechanism for how this authority is transmitted from the whole can vary from one community to another. The essential requirement is that the community establishes the authority belonging to some individual or set of individuals that is smaller than the entire population.

Must we agree that a leader’s decisions are always for the best? Are we always and everywhere obliged to carry out the commands of an authority no matter what? Even in situations where we are not asked to do anything sinful, virtue does not mean that everyone will agree on the best means for achieving the common good.{22} The possibility of conflict over the demands of the common good points to the need for virtues, specifically obedience and piety. Obedience is the act of individuals carrying out the dictates of superiors. St. Thomas explains that “the one who obeys is moved by those commanding, from a necessity of justice, to some action, just as a natural thing is moved by the power of a mover with a necessity of nature.”{23} As a virtue, obedience perfects the will’s ability to carry out orders quickly and easily. We act from obedience when we fulfill our superiors’ wishes because they come from our superiors.{24} It is possible for us to practice obedience when we agree with our orders, but obedience obviously becomes much more evident when we disagree with what is asked of us.{25} When a priest accepts a difficult parish assignment because his bishop assigns it, he demonstrates respect for his bishop’s authority. Obedience does not require that we follow each and every command we receive from a superior. We need not carry out orders when they are outside the scope of the authority’s purview or when they conflict with a higher authority. Should a general command his soldiers to kill civilians in war, such acts conflict with the natural law. Human ordinances that conflict with the natural law are unjust. Thus, soldiers are not bound to follow their commanding officers’ orders if those orders are intrinsically evil. Should a bishop demand that a priest lie, the priest would be bound in conscience not to carry out such an act because it conflicts with a higher duty to God.{26} In such a case, the true sin falls on the bishop. Authority cannot oblige us to sin.

Although obedience perfects our willingness to follow orders, piety refers more to our attitudes to those in positions of authority. St. Thomas explains that “it pertains to piety to show devotion to parents and one’s country.”{27} Piety demands that we show proper deference to those in positions of authority. The pious person does not simply obey his leaders. He refrains from speaking poorly of them, and he only expresses disagreements when necessary and then in the proper circumstances. Piety can extend to any of those who are in positions of authority over us. Religion, for example, is the species of piety in relation to God.{28} Catholics owe filial piety to their pastor, local bishop, and the pope in Rome. Children exercise piety toward their parents by showing proper respect and gratitude. We fail in piety when we defame or show disrespect to authority figures. Piety, like obedience, does not require that we agree with our superiors’ decisions. To be pious, we must give deference to those over us and be measured in our public disagreements. A priest may disagree with his bishop’s policies regarding certain matters within the diocese. The priest could express his criticisms to the bishop privately and even perhaps seek counsel from other priests to ensure that he is acting reasonably. These are not failures of piety. The priest would violate piety if he voiced his disagreements to parishioners or spoke with local media outlets of his criticisms. Any insulting or demeaning language would likewise be a violation of piety.

Obedience and piety clearly serve an important role in the exercise of authority. Without these virtues in the people, those in authority are hindered from carrying out their responsibilities. Leaders cannot fulfill their duties when those meant to follow them refuse to obey their dictates. Disrespect toward leaders makes disobedience more likely. When we publicly denigrate and insult our authorities, we suggest that we ought not care what they say. If football players insult and criticize their coach, then they may begin to disregard his play calls and carry out their own plans. Such division will inevitably result in failure. Soldiers who lack respect for their commanding officers will not work together to achieve their mission objectives. Such failures will lead to their deaths and the deaths of many others. In the same way, political authority requires that citizens agree to follow their leaders’ ordinances and respect them even in disagreement. Obedience and piety do not mean that those with authority hold a higher degree of personal dignity or value. Obedience is necessary for authorities to fulfill their responsibilities. Piety is the due response to those under the burden of leadership. The famous phrase “heavy is the head that wears the crown” refers to the gravity of an authority’s decisions. Leaders do indeed wield great power but also face the consequences of making poor decisions. Individuals who take on this burden for the good of the community deserve respect and gratitude. To be sure, many will misuse this authority. We may face circumstances when we must report the evils and crimes of leaders. Neither obedience nor piety require that we condone misdeeds. On the other hand, leaders may make well-intentioned but bad choices. For such poor decisions that are not actually evil, rulers will face judgment. But followers must leave such judgment to God.

These considerations help us understand the extent to which consent does and does not play a role in authority. Individual consent is not the source of authority. Rather, it is the consent of the whole people who transmit their authority to some individual or group of individuals. Furthermore, consent does not mean that an elected official holds authority simply to carry out the preferences of the people. The coach driver theory of representation views political leaders as mere functionaries. As the cab driver exists only to fulfill the wishes of passengers, this view does not allow leaders to act in ways contrary to the desires of their people. The upshot of the coach driver theory is that leaders do not genuinely hold authority. Consent by the people genuinely passes along authority to leaders to govern for the common good as they see fit. The people may respond by withdrawing this authority through electing new leaders. Finally, consent does not mean that citizens may disrespect leaders and their decisions when they disagree. Obedience and the virtue of piety reveal that we must respect and follow elected officials. Citizens are not by any means committed to agreeing to any and all commands of superiors. Authority does require that, whether we consent to the officials’ decisions or not, we must obey and defer to them.

We have now seen the essential meaning of authority in the Catholic tradition. Authority ensures that actions are unified for a shared purpose. The exercise of authority can take many different forms in a plurality of regimes. The mechanism for passing on authority depends also on the social organizations of a given people. Authority does not exist due to any deficiency in persons nor as a mere means for the ruled to enact their individual wishes. Rather, authority gives someone the right to judge what the common good requires. As we have seen, the role of authority depends significantly on the meaning of the common good and the view we take of the overall purpose of the political community.

Accounts of the Common Good

Having considered the meaning of authority within the Catholic intellectual tradition, we can now examine the different ways in which the common good has been understood in Catholic thought. Authority is deeply connected to the common good. The way in which a community understands its common good directly influences what it takes to be the purpose and scope of political authority. Different approaches have emerged in the Catholic intellectual tradition, and I will focus on three periods. First, we will see the debates that arose in the post-World War II era where Catholics were concerned to bring Catholic principles to bear on the problems of totalitarianism and mass destruction. Secondly, we will consider a series of arguments that arose with the New Natural Law (NNL) movement towards rethinking the traditional Thomist view of the political community’s role in the lives of individuals. Lastly, the onset of post-liberalism has caused some Catholics to question the coherency of modern nation-states due to their underlying presuppositions. Such considerations have led to reconceiving of the common good in contemporary circumstances. First, however, it is important to contextualize the concept of the common good in the Catholic tradition within contemporary political philosophy. I will briefly describe two prominent political philosophies that offer rival accounts of the common good. I will broadly refer to these as liberalism and conservatism, though these terms point to a family of views rather than strict doctrines.

Liberalism does not identify a specific set of beliefs but rather a general approach and view of the common good. Primarily, liberalism is the attempt to ground justice and authority without making any strong claims regarding human nature, good and evil, or God. Classical political philosophy, and its view of authority, assumes an objective standard of human flourishing. Law serves the common good by habituating individuals into the virtues necessary for good human lives. Natural law guides the actions and decisions of lawgivers. Thus, communities cannot flourish if they directly violate the natural law. Two prominent contemporary writers, John Rawls and Robert Nozick, offer instead a liberal account of political philosophy. They both begin with the same general starting points. Individuals with rival and competing accounts of the best human life must find ways to cooperate with one another so as to respect equally the rights of all citizens.{29} The goal of political community then becomes the securing of rights. Rawls’ and Nozick’s respective views diverge in ways that reveal the ambiguity in the initial appeal to rights.{30} Nozick represents libertarian liberalism. He describes the state as “the dominant protective association in a territory.”{31} The role of the state is only to protect and guard rights. Rawls offers a more egalitarian approach. He denies that society is a genuine good in the sense that it represents a specific “comprehensive doctrine.”{32} Society helps individuals to realize their own conception of a good human life. The state has a positive role in providing citizens with the material goods necessary for exercising their rights. Nozick sees a passive role for the state in which government is limited to protecting rights from interference. Rawls argues, however, that even if citizens have rights; they need the means to use them. The inability to exercise one’s rights is the same as having them denied. Rawls and Nozick disagree on the extent to which the state may interfere to aid citizens in exercising their rights. Their key point of commonality is that the common good is measured by rights.

Pierre Manent and Roger Scruton present a rival account of the common good that we can describe as conservative. They both defend the priority of the nation as the source of identity and norms of justice.{33} National identities presuppose a shared culture, history, and language. Liberalism appeals to rights that abstract from civic identity and center on a universal humanism. Conservatives like Manent and Scruton believe that political arguments first require identifying who we are as human beings living together in this specific place. Manent and Scruton view the nation-state as a combination of state and civil society.{34} The state is the law–making and enforcing body, and civil society is the collection of private institutions forming the bulk of our daily lives. Legislatures, judges, and police officers are examples of the state, while businesses, churches, and hospitals are part of civil society. This distinction becomes important for Manent and Scruton as they discuss the means for achieving genuine liberty today. They agree with the liberals that the state’s primary role is to secure the rights of those within civil society. They disagree that we can achieve this end without some prior agreements on human identity and meaning. We must have some understanding of goods to determine rights. The state’s role is not to guide civil society to a specific purpose. The institutions of civil society all have their own internal purposes and goods. The state merely ensures that all citizens and institutions achieve an orderly life together.

The common good within Manent and Scruton’s conservatism mirrors the liberal view. Liberals such as Rawls and Nozick agree that the state is primarily concerned with securing individual rights and not imposing a specific view of the good. The difference, however, is that, for liberals, rights belong to individuals as individuals without any view of human nature or identity. Conservatives, on the other hand, argue that our basic rights presume some prior understanding of who we are and what is good for us. The state, apart from securing individual rights, works to preserve and maintain its pre-political culture. Separating the state from civil society means that no overall purpose exists for the nation itself aside from maintaining its identity.{35} The goods of civil society come and go as individuals choose to participate in various communities. Their daily, practical decisions need not consider the good of the overall nation.

With this background in mind, I will now consider three discussions in the tradition of Catholic political philosophy that help reveal the ways in which some Catholic thinkers have tried to adapt the traditional views of the common good and authority to contemporary social life. These figures largely have Thomistic starting points. For this reason, although he is a Catholic but not a Thomist, I have chosen to consider Manent separately. We will begin with the work of Jacques Maritain, Charles De Koninck, and Yves Simon on the common good of political society. Next, I will move to the debate between John Finnis of the “New Natural Law” movement and those critics who have challenged his view of the political common good. Finally, I will turn to the work of Alasdair MacIntyre and others who have begun to challenge the fundamental liberal starting points of modern nations.

Maritain begins his political account by identifying human beings as possessing individuality and personality.{36} Individuality refers to the biological characteristics of human beings. Through our materiality, we resemble non-animal species as specific instances of human nature. Personality refers to the spiritual reality of human nature that we possess through our rational soul. Personality gives us each a deep inner life of experience, and it draws us into communion and unity with other persons. Maritain is quite clear that these concepts do not name two distinct principles or beings.{37} Rather, what Maritain refers to as two “poles” are ways of viewing the relations human beings possess as material beings with rational souls. Individuality and personality also lead Maritain to distinguish a temporal and eternal common good for human beings.{38} The temporal good is found within the city and state, where individuals are parts of a whole that is the political community. The eternal common good refers to the heavenly community of the beatific vision. In the case of the eternal common good, persons are not parts of the political community. In a temporal society, individuals are subordinate to the common good of the temporal political society. The eternal common good, however, is higher than the temporal good. For this reason, Maritain argues that “with respect to the eternal destiny of the soul, society exists for each person and is subordinated to it.”{39} Human beings as individuals prefer the temporal common good over their own good. As persons, however, we can say that they desire their eternal good more than the temporal common good. Maritain then suggests that the temporal common good of political society is subordinate, at least indirectly, to the private good of persons.

An important aspect of Maritain’s account of the common good is his approach to the problem of pluralism. Rather than try to impose one overarching view of the good, Maritain suggests that we appeal to rights.{40} These rights are “practical conclusions” that serve as the basis for political arguments. Maritain insists that we do not need to agree on the reason we hold these rights. Citizens must only accept a common set of rights. To be sure, Maritain argues that the natural law of the Catholic tradition is the only fully satisfactory, rational basis for rights.{41} Natural law requires a broadly classical metaphysical realism in the Aristotelian and Thomistic traditions. Political arguments, however, do not require that all those involved possess a true account of why we have these rights. A Catholic and an atheist do not have to agree on the theoretical basis for rights. Notably, Maritain believes that the “ontological element” of the natural law (the way the natural law works through our human nature) becomes evident in the way that individuals with widely different worldviews can still have the same set of rights. Maritain’s appeal to rights as the practical basis for shared political arguments is perhaps the best attempt to bring together a Thomistic account of the natural law with political liberalism.

A final point to consider from Maritain’s work is his appeal to the need for a world governmental authority. As we have noted above, authority is the act of assuring unity geared toward a shared purpose. We generally think of authority only within the context of single nations or societies, but Maritain points to the possibility of a worldwide authority. We can imagine a global common good to include the peaceful relations of nations, the ability to respond to natural disasters, and the ability to aid in the economic development of poorer nations. Like the common good of individual countries, a worldwide common good would require an authority to ensure that all nations work towards that common end. Maritain believes a world government is needed to avoid continued global conflict.{42} Bodies such as the League of Nations, the United Nations, and the European Union are examples of attempts to endow transnational institutions with political and legal authority.

Writing in the same period, De Koninck published a work, On the Primacy of the Common Good against the Personalists, in which he criticized the philosophical view of personalism and its relation to the common good.{43} Many considered this work to be a criticism of Maritain. For example, Fr. Ignatius Eschmann, O.P., published a stinging critique of De Koninck’s book, accusing him of misrepresenting both Maritain and the thought of St. Thomas.{44} DeKoninck then responded by defending his account both as a philosopher and as a Thomist.{45} De Koninck does not, in fact, mention Maritain by name in his initial piece, but, given his reference to personalism, many understood him to have Maritain in mind.{46} Maritain himself briefly alludes to the debate, noting that he did not believe he was implicated.{47}

De Koninck explicitly takes the work of St. Thomas as his starting point and emphasizes that the common good is both superior to and, in fact, a greater good for individuals than their private good. He explains that the common good “has the note of superabundance and is eminently diffusive of itself insofar as it is more communicable; it extends to the singular more than the singular good does.”{48} The common good is greater for the individual than the singular good because it is objectively a greater good. It extends to more people than the individual good. The relation of the individual to the common good gives value and dignity to the individual.{49} Since human beings in a community each have an equal relation to the common good, to secure the common good means respecting the place of all in the community. Seeking the common good for the sake of oneself and to the exclusion of others “is a love which looks on the common good as a private good.”{50} To attain the good of a symphony, individual musicians must harmonize with others and allow them to play their parts. Trying to attain the good of the symphony as an individual good will mean musicians fail to attain the common good and also their own individual goods. Similarly, the common good of political society requires all citizens to respect the good of their neighbors. Failing to do so would mean treating the common good as an individual good. In such cases, the individuals would fail to attain the common good they desire.

An important element of De Koninck’s account is the hierarchical relation of common goods. This hierarchy begins with common goods (such as the family) and reaches God as the common good par excellence. Just as families, symphonies, and nations have a common good, the world and the universe possess common goods. All of creation is ordered to God as its ultimate common good.{51} God has no good other than Himself, and all beings other than God seek Him as their greatest common good. The value and dignity of all creatures follow from their teleological relation to the common good of the cosmos and ultimately to God. Inorganic matter, plants, and nonhuman animals have value, albeit a lesser value than human beings. Part of their telos is to benefit rational creatures. For this reason, human beings can use the goods of nature for their own benefit. We grow crops, raise animals, and appropriate their fruits for human purposes. We may not use the goods of nature however we wish. Limits exist on the extent to which we may use the natural world for our own purposes, though we cannot, for example, hunt and fish wildlife to the point of extinction simply for sport. We may not destroy forests or harm animals with no concern other than our own benefit. The need for us to respect nature follows from the fact that God has created the world for our good and to glorify Himself. This respect owed to creation finds a clear place in the work of the popes who spoke of ecology as a concern for Catholic social teaching.{52}We can acknowledge both that the goods of nature are for the sake of human use and that we must be prudent in using them.

The final account of the common good we will consider from this period is that of Yves Simon. Simon raises the question of the extent to which all individuals must desire and intend the common good. He distinguishes between the common good considered formally versus materially.{53} By formally, Simon means the willing of the overall flourishing and shared purpose of the community. The common good materially considered refers to the way in which a particular community chooses to realize their overall flourishing. Simon explains that “the volition and intention of the common good are guaranteed by virtue itself, independently of all authority.”{54} Virtue does not, however, mean that everyone will agree on what the common good requires or how the community ought to realize it. Indeed, the very purpose of authority is to ensure common action for that good. Thus, though citizens need not will the common good materially, they must will it formally. In the previously mentioned example of a symphony, different musicians will have conflicting opinions on how best to play together. Each musician must look to the good of his or her own performance, while the conductor looks to the good of the whole. The conductor must determine, in consultation with orchestra members, how to achieve the common good of the symphony. In a similar way, legislative and judicial leaders determine what is best for the common good materially considered, but citizens do not need to agree that those decisions are in fact the best or most prudent.

Furthermore, Simon uses this distinction to explain when individuals must subordinate their private good to the common good. Simon argues that virtue requires that we prefer the common good formally considered to our private good, but that we should prefer our private good when we consider the common good materially speaking. Simon imagines a woman whose husband faces the death penalty as punishment for murder.{55} The judge represents the authority determining whether the common good materially requires the death of a murderer. The convict’s wife, however, owes it to herself and family to argue for the life of her husband. We might think that the family ought to acknowledge that the punishment of death is fair and just. Simon, however, suggests that this attitude mistakes the difference between the common good formally and materially considered. Citizens must only will the common good formally considered.{56} They would violate the good of marriage and family if they did not advocate for the murderer’s life. In fact, failing to pursue private goods undermines the common good. The various private institutions of a society must seek to promote their own specific goods, even to the exclusion of other institutions. Public authority has the role of determining what the common good materially considered demands.

The next set of Catholic debates regarding the common good follow from the work of John Finnis and the so-called NNL. Finnis follows the line of thinkers beginning with Germain Grisez that challenges traditionally held interpretations of St. Thomas’s account of natural law.{57} Finnis argues that the political community, i.e. the state, is an instrumental good rather than an intrinsic good.{58} Traditionally, Thomists held that St. Thomas viewed the political community as the highest good of practical life. Thus, the political community is a good desirable for its own sake. Finnis, however, challenges this view both on philosophical grounds and as an interpretation of St. Thomas.{59} The overall NNL movement views “basic goods” as the ends of practical reasoning that we desire as human beings. We seek these goods for themselves.{60} Finnis argues that the political community is not such a basic good. He notes that we pursue goods such as knowledge, family, friendship, and the like because we want them for their own sake. We only desire the state because it is useful and necessary for individuals to achieve basic goods. For this reason, the common good of the state is limited primarily to the security of peace and social tranquility.

Finnis distinguishes two ways in which we can speak about a common good of political life. Initially, Finnis focuses on the instrumental value of the political common good, but he then shifts to speaking of the political common good as meaning either the state or the all-around good of social life.{61} These two forms of community seek different ends. The legal and juridical arm of society, i.e., the state, is only directed to the ends of securing peace and order. The common good of the state is limited. The overall flourishing of social life for the fulfillment of human goods, however, is indeed a great good for human life. This all-inclusive social good is desirable for itself. This move avoids some of the philosophical challenges Finnis’s critics raised. He denies, however, that any one body ought to have as its responsibility this all-around good. Finnis does not use the language of state and civil society, but his distinction between the specifically political good, which is purely instrumental, and the all-inclusive good dovetails with these two concepts. Finnis then presents a view of the political common good as both a good in itself but also as instrumental. His account fits well with the common experience of persons acknowledging a deep love and willingness to sacrifice for their home country while also asserting a social contract with their nation’s government.

Finnis’s account of the common good then presents a different way of viewing authority. Although we noted above that political authority directs men and women to virtue, Finnis challenges this conception, holding to a limited role for the state. Rather than instill complete virtue, the state only concerns itself with the virtuous habits necessary for citizens to maintain justice.{62} Finnis’s work lends itself more to an anti-perfectionist view, which is the claim that a legal authority may not prohibit acts for moral reasons only.{63} The state can legally punish immoral actions, such as adultery or the use of pornography, but only because these moral evils lead to acts harmful to others. Laws may only concern public evil. So-called purely private immorality is not the competence of the state. We should not think, though, that the state would then allow many evils. Actions we might think of as private evils often have public ramifications. Drunkenness seems like a private vice, but public intoxication can cause harm to others through erratic behavior or impaired driving. Drug use and prostitution often bring with them violence and organized crime. Lying in official legal proceedings subverts justice. Although these actions can occur privately, they often have public consequences.

Critics have argued that Finnis fails both on philosophical grounds and as an interpretation of St. Thomas. Fr. Lawrence Dewan, O.P., suggested that Finnis misunderstands the overall goal of St. Thomas on law.{64} Finnis rightly points out that St. Thomas believes human legislators are only competent to judge and command external actions, but those laws have the goal of promoting overall, complete virtue. Therefore, the state does not view complete virtue as its aim but only the virtue necessary to achieve peace and order. John Goyette and Michael Pakaluk offer philosophical arguments suggesting that concepts such as patriotism and sacrifice for the sake of the common good make little sense if the political community is only instrumentally good.{65} Patriotism reflects the devotion we feel for our homeland, and for this reason we especially honor those who have died defending the nation. Similarly, police, firefighters, and other first responders killed in the line of duty receive special recognition. If the state is only an instrumental good, why ought one die for it? Daniel Mark suggests that patriotism is merely an expression of gratitude for the important role the state plays in our lives.{66} Such gratitude, however, does not imply that the state is an intrinsic good. Many of these debates in some way presume an answer to the question of whether the political community is indeed a good desirable for itself or only instrumentally so.

Alasdair MacIntyre represents the third trend of broadly Thomistic thought regarding the common good. MacIntyre’s work has inspired a school of thought known as post-liberalism. As the name suggests, post-liberals share a critique of the separation between political life and claims about human goods that underlies much of contemporary liberalism.{67} MacIntyre offers a unique account of the common good by appealing to the role it plays in human practical reasoning. He describes politics as the practice of citizens reasoning together about how best to achieve their shared goods.{68} Citizens come together to deliberate and discuss how they will organize and structure their common lives. The requirements for such communal deliberation closely resemble many of the precepts of natural law.{69} The upshot of political deliberations is that all members of the community understand how each of their individual choices and practices lead to their overall well-being. MacIntyre’s view of the common good leads to his more controversial view, namely that the best political communities are small-scale and local.{70} Communal deliberations can only occur in relatively small groups. Such deliberations would allow all individuals to understand their community’s view of the common good and how each of their individual choices leads to that good.

In MacIntyre’s account, those in authority “justify their claims only by showing that the exercise of their political authority accords with norms that serve the common good and the human good.”{71} MacIntyre explicitly connects authority to the practical achievement of a common good. The community has a concrete understanding of what they take to be their overall shared good and flourishing. Leaders then defend their decisions by showing how these policies or laws reach their common good. The justification of authority does not mean that all must agree on the means to achieve this common good. Rather, those in positions of authority must show the way that their decisions and choices lead to the common good in which they all wish to share. MacIntyre adds to the account of authority in Simon and others the explicit statement of precisely how various acts relate to the common good. MacIntyre believes citizens must be able to question their authorities directly. Such discussions allow citizens to acknowledge the view of the common good they possess. What is unique to MacIntyre’s account is the awareness all members have concerning the specific and concrete ways that their individual choices contribute to wider common goods in the community. Post-liberalism has had a tendency to follow MacIntyre’s rejection of a liberal view of the common good, seeing a much greater role for the political leader’s use of power. Post-liberalism does not name a clear set of beliefs. Rather, it names a group of writers who followed MacIntyre’s rejection of liberal neutrality in favor of communities that embody a substantive understanding of human goods. Unlike MacIntyre, post-liberals have focused more on the role of political and institutional power rather than on shared practical reasoning. Patrick Deneen followed his critique of liberal theory with an account of how a movement away from liberalism might take place.{72} Adrian Vermeule, perhaps most of all the so-called post-liberals, advocated for taking the liberal positions of power and redirecting them toward a genuine politics of the common good.{73} Catholic integralism is another form of post-liberalism in which the state not only directs citizens to a temporal common good but also serves to guide them towards their supernatural good.{74} These post-liberals share with MacIntyre the view that law is closely connected to virtue and human flourishing.

From the above, we can see that the common good plays an integral part in how community members understand and justify their authority. The way a community understands its common good determines what individuals take to be the purpose and limits of authority. Different views assume some understanding of a common activity. The authority then serves to achieve that end. Liberalism takes a more utilitarian view of political community where individuals sacrifice some freedoms for the sake of the benefits they receive. The conservative view tends to see the preservation of national identity and liberties as the common end. Within the Thomistic tradition, starting from the post-World War II period, we find Maritain, De Koninck, and Simon discussing the relationship between different types of common good and the challenges of pluralism. Law develops virtue for the complete perfection of human beings. Maritain’s view suggests a more limited role for authority since social pluralism requires that we view rights as purely practical principles of political agreement. De Koninck emphasizes the priority of the common good, which would lead to authority more directly acting in citizens’ lives. The NNL movement views the common good of political communities as limited to securing temporal peace and order. The authority of the state is then limited and does not seek to habituate citizens into complete human virtue. Rather, the state only looks to habituate citizens in maintaining public order. Such an account lends itself more to an anti-perfectionist view of law. MacIntyre raises the question of what precisely it means for political leaders to justify their authority. We might say that other Thomists take it for granted that leaders act for the common good, but MacIntyre emphasizes the need for communities to deliberate about the meaning of their shared ends. In this way, more citizens begin to see that they actually have a shared purpose.

Challenges to Authority

This final section will discuss the possible challenges and tensions that might exist for political authority. Simon observes that, when a given society does not seek a true common good, “there will always be something awkward, to say the least, about the vindication of authority.”{75} What happens when citizens recognize that their political leaders are not ruling for the sake of the common good? Must citizens obey the dictates of unjust rulers and tyrants, or is it permissible to reject such commands and even to rebel? St. Thomas offers a guide for judging when we may justly reject the authority of those in power.

St. Thomas explains that all just laws bind us in conscience.{76} The force of human law follows from its connection to the natural law, and the natural law is the rational creature’s participation in the eternal law. Therefore, we sin when we choose to disobey just laws. St. Thomas notes that when a law is unjust we may still owe obedience. Laws may be unjust in two ways. First, they could be unjust through lacking some of the requirements for law, such as imposing unequal requirements, commanding acts outside of the authority’s right, or seeking the good of special interests. Laws of this kind “are more acts of violence than laws.”{77} St. Thomas, however, does not believe that we are free to disobey these laws simply because they are unjust. More consideration is necessary. For example, we must ask what kinds of acts does the law forbid or command? What damage could I do by not obeying the law? Some laws might be unjust because the ruler who passes them is a tyrant or explicitly rejects the natural law. A ruler might also tax the poor at the same rate or even more than the wealthy, hence treating all as though they have the same material resources. St. Thomas explains that such laws “do not bind in conscience, unless perhaps due to the vice of scandal or disturbance on account of which a man ought to cede his right.”{78} For laws unjust in this first way, we may be bound to follow them because the harm our disobedience causes outweighs whatever good we might achieve. We still pay taxes and obey traffic laws, even if tyrants command them, because doing so allows us to attain certain necessary goods such as public services and safe transportation. For laws of the second kind, St. Thomas refers to tyrants commanding acts of idolatry and other such acts that contradict the moral law. “In no way,” St. Thomas concludes, “ought one to observe such laws.”{79}

Some unjust laws do not strictly bind us in justice, but we might be bound to follow them for prudential reasons. We are bound, however, to disobey other laws. We can view these two types of laws as those that command what is intrinsically evil and those that prescribe what is at least neutral. For example, imagine a community ruled by a tyrant who came into power through military conquest. The tyrant demands payment through taxes for the purposes of funding public services but also to enrich himself. The tyrant also continues to enforce laws regarding traffic safety, violent crimes, and other ordinances aimed at maintaining basic social order. The tyrant may also have passed laws requiring citizens to perform acts of worship to him as a divine figure. The tyrant, since he rules only for his own good and not the common good, is an unjust ruler. Therefore, he does not possess proper authority to enact laws. For these reasons, his laws are unjust. As St. Thomas has explained, however, we might be bound to follow them. Laws proscribing murder, theft, and violence clearly follow the natural law even if human law is unjust. Paying taxes and following traffic rules obligate us because refusing to obey these laws would cause greater harm. Disobeying traffic laws risks causing harm to others through traffic collisions, whereas refusing to pay taxes takes away the means necessary to fund services such as police, fire, and emergency medical care. Furthermore, disobeying laws gives the impression to others that we view laws as optional. On the other hand, the tyrant’s command to worship him as a god is indeed intrinsically evil. We are bound in conscience to disobey such laws. St. Thomas’s discussion of unjust laws then allows us to understand how to judge when we must follow bad laws and when we must reject them.

Do we ever reach a point when we are justified in rejecting the authority of a ruler? The Declaration of Independence, one of the founding documents of the United States of America, begins with the stark assertion that a nation’s peoples may at some point have recourse to rebellion.{80} St. Thomas considers the question of whether it is right to resist tyrannical rulers. Those who seek to resist or even remove a tyrant are not guilty of the sin of sedition because the tyrant acts unjustly because he rules only for the private good.{81} St. Thomas cautions, however, that those who seek to resist a tyrant must be certain that they possess the authority of removing a ruler and that their actions will not cause greater harm than they suffered under the tyrant.{82} Even if the rebellion is successful, infighting could occur amongst those left to rule. Men who have conspired to overthrow a ruler are susceptible to jealousy and greed. Authoritarian leaders are often replaced by other authoritarian leaders. St. Thomas does not, however, claim that revolt is never just. He simply sets a very high bar for when such actions are permissible. The unjust ruler’s acts must be so egregiously evil that the people simply cannot endure it any longer, and rebels must have a reasonable chance of succeeding in their rebellion. St. Thomas notes that a failed rebellion could lead to even greater evils should the tyrant seek retribution. Just replacements must be present to take over after tyrants are removed. These considerations show that full blown rebellion requires extreme harm and evil on the part of rulers and a reasonable chance that what will replace these rulers outweighs those evils.

Conclusion

In this entry, we have considered the meaning of authority, its relation to the common good, and the challenges that arise when we face unjust rulers and laws. Authority is the cause of unity in action for a political community. Cooperation requires some method of determining the means to achieve ends. We rely on either unanimous agreement or authority. The use of authority requires some individuals to accept decisions with which they do not agree, and practical reasoning does not often allow for one and only one way of achieving an end. Therefore, authority will be necessary to reach agreement on many practical questions. The scope of authority will also vary depending on what a given community takes its common good to be. Those who view the common good as a useful good will likely take a more limited view of authority. The political ruler has the right to issue laws that aid citizens in achieving their personal interest. On the other hand, those who find the common good to be a part of flourishing human lives will see authority in part involved in the work of habituating men and women in the virtues necessary to become good human beings. This account of authority within political philosophy underlies the various teachings and exhortations found within CST. Thus, considering the true meaning of authority helps in properly interpreting and understanding the obligations it places on world leaders today.